Debunking Arguments and Metaphysical Laws by Barker, Jonathan
Debunking arguments and metaphysical laws
Jonathan Barker1
 Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract I argue that one’s views about which ‘‘metaphysical laws’’ obtain—in-
cluding laws about what is identical with what, about what is reducible to what, and
about what grounds what—can be used to deflect or neutralize the threat posed by a
debunking explanation. I use a well-known debunking argument in the metaphysics
of material objects as a case study. Then, after defending the proposed strategy from
the charge of question-begging, I close by showing how the proposed strategy can
be used by certain moral realists to resist the evolutionary debunking arguments.
Keywords Debunking arguments  Defeaters  Material objects  Laws of
metaphysics  Identity  Reduction  Grounding
Moral beliefs, mathematical beliefs, religious beliefs, and beliefs about which
composite objects exist have all been the target of so-called ‘‘debunking’’
arguments. Debunking arguments typically begin with the claim that there is a
debunking explanation of some type of belief we hold. A debunking explanation is a
complete causal explanation of the origins of some type of belief, which makes no
reference to the facts that are those beliefs’ putative subject matter. Once we
concede the existence of such an explanation, the debunker contends, we thereby
lose our justification for holding those beliefs.
In this paper I shall argue that one’s views about which ‘‘metaphysical laws’’
obtain—such as the laws about what is identical with what, about what is reducible
to what, and about what grounds what—can be used block the epistemic threat
posed by debunking arguments.
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I will develop the proposed strategy by using a well-known debunking argument
in the metaphysics of material objects as a case study. Then, after defending the
proposed strategy from the charge of question-begging, I shall argue that certain
moral realists can use the proposed strategy to reply to the evolutionary debunking
arguments in meta-ethics. I will conclude by outlining the strategy in its most
generalized form.
1 The overdetermination argument
Outside the metaphysics seminar room, our beliefs about the existence of such
ordinary composite objects such as baseballs, mountains, trees, and animals—our
‘‘object beliefs’’—are based primarily on our apparent perceptual experiences as of
those objects.1 It is plausible that these perceptual experiences as of composite
objects—or ‘‘object experiences,’’ for short—give us prima facie justification for
believing that objects of the relevant sort exist.2 For example, your having a
perceptual experience as of a baseball prima facie justifies you in believing that
there is a baseball.
We can, of course, lose our perceptual justification for our object beliefs.
Specifically, we can gain ‘‘defeaters’’ for our object beliefs.3 Let us say that a belief
of yours D is a defeater for some other belief of yours B just in case holding D
makes it rationally impermissible for you to continue holding B.4 The perceptual
debunker concedes our object beliefs enjoy prima facie justification and that, prior
to encountering a debunking argument, it is perfectly rational of us to hold the
object beliefs we do. However, the perceptual debunker’s goal is to give us a
defeater for those object beliefs.5
As a case study, consider Trenton Merricks’ well-known perceptual debunking
argument, the Overdetermination Argument (the OA). The argument has two steps.
1 Korman (2015) and Merricks (2001, 2016) all emphasize the primacy of our causal-perceptual reasons
for believing in ordinary composite objects.
2 Note that my use of the phrase ‘‘object experience’’ does not commit me to the controversial view that
our perceptual experiences literally have high-level kind-membership properties as constituents. For
example, when I say that we sometimes have baseball experiences, I am not thereby committing myself to
the view that the property of being a baseball is a literal constituent in those experiences. For all I say in
this paper, perhaps baseball experiences have only simple, lower-level properties—such as the property of
being round, the property of being white with red stitching, the property of being such-and-such a size,
etc.—as its constituents. Korman (2015) contains a helpful discussion of how this difficult issue in the
philosophy of perception relates to our perceptual evidence for composite material objects.
3 Merricks (2003) and Korman (2015) Chapter 7 both understand debunking arguments targeting our
object beliefs as attempts to give us epistemic defeaters. Moon (2017) and Korman forthcoming
understand debunking arguments more generally as attempts to give us defeaters for the beliefs they are
targeting.
4 Plantinga (1993), p. 361.
5 Specifically, the debunker claims that we gain an ‘‘undercutting’’ defeater for our object beliefs. A
belief that p is an undercutting defeater for a belief q just in case the belief that p is a defeater for the




In the first step, Merricks argues that there is a complete causal explanation of our
object experiences—and thus our object beliefs—that does not include the
composite objects themselves. Specifically, he argues that—whether or not
composite objects exist—the causal activities of microphysical particles arranged
in certain object-shaped ways fully causally explain why we have the object beliefs
we do.6
The first step of the OA begins by asking us to suppose that there are composite
objects. For example, suppose there are baseballs. Now suppose that a baseball
strikes a glass window, causing it to shatter. Surely there is also a complete causal
explanation of the window’s shattering that only involves the joint activities of
atoms arranged baseball wise. More generally, if there are baseballs, then any effect
caused by a baseball is also fully causally explained by the activities of the
baseball’s composing parts, the atoms arranged baseball wise.
Now suppose some atoms arranged baseball wise—the bs—compose a baseball.
And suppose that baseball causes you, via causing you to have a baseball
experience, to form the belief that there is a baseball. Since everything the baseball
causes is also fully caused by its composing parts, the bs, it follows that your belief
that there is a baseball—your ‘‘baseball belief’’—is fully causally explained by the
joint activities of the bs.
On the other hand, suppose the bs do not compose a baseball. Then your visual
experiences as of a baseball—and thus your baseball belief—is not caused by a
baseball. Instead, your belief that there is a baseball is solely caused by the joint
activities of the bs. Therefore, if the bs do not compose a baseball, then your
baseball belief is fully causally explained by the joint activities of the bs.
We can thus formulate the first step of Merricks’ OA as follows7:
(OA1) If there is a baseball, then my baseball belief is fully caused by the bs.
(OA2) If there is no baseball, then my baseball belief is fully caused by the bs.
(OA3) Either there is a baseball or there is no baseball.
(OA4) Therefore, my baseball belief is fully caused by the bs (from OA1, OA2,
and OA3).
Establishing the truth of OA4 is the first step of Merricks’ Overdetermination
Argument (OA). In the second step, Merricks argues that OA4 is a debunking
explanation of your belief that there is a baseball. In other words, the second step is
6 Strictly speaking, Merricks only argues that our beliefs about which inanimate composite objects exist
are fully causally explained by the joint work of microphysical particles appropriately arranged. For,
according to Merricks, our beliefs in the existence of human organisms are not ultimately based on
causal-perceptual experiences and therefore escape debunking. See Merricks (2001), pp. 85–117.
7 Notice that this version of the Overdetermination Argument does not use the word ‘‘overdetermina-
tion.’’ Formulations of the argument using that term are susceptible to objections based on what is and is
not genuine overdetermination. See Thomasson (2007), Sider (2003) and Schaffer (2010a) for versions of
this objection. However, as Merricks points out in Merricks (2016) fn. 1, such debates about the nature of
overdetermination are not ultimately relevant to the success of the debunking version of the
Overdetermination Argument. Korman (2015) Chapter 10 is one of the few discussions of Merricks’s
Overdetermination Argument to recognize this point.
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the claim that your acceptance of OA4 gives you a defeater for your otherwise
justified baseball belief.
In the second step of the OA, Merricks argues that anyone who realizes the truth
of OA4 thereby loses whatever justification she had for her baseball belief. He offers
the following analogy:
You gaze upon the Emerald City. Its buildings appear to be green. You are
then informed that your glasses have green lenses. Thus you learn that the
buildings would appear green to you even if they were some other color. And
so you are no longer justified in believing that the buildings are green. Let us
say that your belief about your glasses defeats any justification, based only on
your ‘‘green building’’ sensory experiences, for your belief that the buildings
are green.8
Call this the ‘‘Emerald City case.’’ Notice that we can distinguish two defeaters in
the Emerald City case.9 First, you realize that the city would appear green even if it
were not green. And so, presumably, you realize that you would have believed that
the city is green even if it were not green. You have thus realized that your ‘‘green
city belief’’ is insensitive to the facts about whether the city is green. This
realization is a defeater for your green city belief.
But you have also realized something about the causal origins of your green city
belief—you have realized that the color of your visual experiences as of a city are
fully causally explained by the green tint on your glasses. And so, you can infer,
your belief that the city is green in color is fully causally explained by the green tint
of your glasses. This realization about the causal origins of your green city belief, all
on its own, is a defeater for that belief.
You thus have two defeaters in the Emerald City case—your realization about the
causal origins of your green city belief, and your realization that your green city
belief is insensitive to the facts about whether the city is green.10
Now consider a second case:
You gaze upon a grassy field. It visually appears to you as if there is a
baseball, sitting in the grass. You then realize that your visual experience as of
a baseball is caused by a bunch of things, the atoms arranged baseball wise,
acting in concert. So you also realize that, even if there were no baseball, you
would still have had a visual experience as of a baseball.
Call this simply ‘‘the Baseball case.’’ According to Merricks, your epistemic
situation in the Emerald City case is relevantly analogous to your situation in the
Baseball case. As in the Emerald City case, it seems that you have two defeaters for
your baseball belief.
8 Merricks (2003), pp. 22–23.
9 Korman and Locke forthcoming and Korman forthcoming are two of the only discussions that
explicitly distinguish between these two defeaters.
10 Korman and Locke persuasively argue that the realized ‘‘explanatory disconnect’’ defeater is more
fundamental than the realized insensitivity defeater. If this paper’s central thesis is correct, however, both
of these putative defeaters can be deflected.
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First, the mere realization that your baseball visual experience—and thus your
baseball belief—is fully causally explained by the joint work of the atoms arranged
baseball wise, all by itself, is a defeater for your baseball belief. Your second
defeater is the realization that you still would have had a visual experience as of a
baseball—and thus you still would have held your baseball belief—even if there
were no baseball.
Clearly, your epistemic situation in the Baseball case just is the epistemic
situation you are in upon conceding the truth of OA4 of Merricks’ OA. Therefore,
conceding the truth of OA4 gives you two defeaters for your baseball belief. Of
course, Merricks thinks you have analogous defeaters for your other object beliefs
as well. Once you see how the OA generalizes, you will have defeaters for your
belief in the existence of tables, chairs, trees, mountains, and every other putative
composite object.
I shall argue that whether or not you have any defeaters in the Baseball case
depends upon what background beliefs you have. For, so I shall argue, certain of
your background beliefs can be used as ‘‘defeater-deflectors.’’ Section 2 introduces
and explains the notion of a defeater-deflector. Sections 3–6 argue that certain
beliefs about which metaphysical laws obtain can serve as legitimate, non-circular
defeater-deflectors. Section 7 applies the strategy to evolutionary debunking
arguments metaethics.
2 Defeater-deflectors
Whether or not some belief D is a defeater for you does not depend on the
propositional content of that belief alone. In addition, a belief D is a defeater for you
only if you have no other belief or beliefs that are ‘‘defeater-deflectors.’’11 Roughly,
defeater-deflectors are justified beliefs that prevent some prima facie justified belief
B from being defeated by a potential defeater D.12
Alvin Plantinga gives the following example of a defeater-deflector:
You [get] a defeater for your belief that you see a sheep in the field if I, whom
you know to be the owner of the field, come along and tell you that although
there is no sheep in the field, there is a canine sheep look-alike that often
frequents the field. But you won’t get a defeater, here, if you already think that
I am unreliable on this topic, or that I have a lot to gain by getting you to doubt
that there is a sheep there…. In these cases the looming defeater (defeater
11 Not to be confused with a ‘‘defeater–defeater’’. A belief E is a defeater–defeater just in case at some
time t I hold belief D and D is a defeater for B at t, and then at some later time t ? 1 I hold E and E is a
defeater for D. See Plantinga (2011), pp. 259–64 for more on defeater-deflectors and Moon forthcoming
for a discussion of the role of defeater-deflectors versus defeater-defeaters in the moral debunking
literature.
12 I shall assume here and throughout the paper that a belief of yours can serve as a defeater-deflector
only if you are justified in holding that belief. That is, no irrationally held or unjustified belief can serve as
a legitimate defeater-deflector. The justificatory status of defeater-deflectors will re-arise in Sect. 7.
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belief) will be deflected.13
So your belief that I am unreliable on the topic of sheep and dog-sheep lookalikes is
a defeater-deflector.
Moreover, your belief that I am unreliable on the topic deflects the looming
defeater in the following way: that belief renders it irrational for you to even form
the belief that dog-sheep lookalikes regularly pass through this field or, at least,
renders it irrational for you to form that belief on the basis of my testimony alone. If
I had formed the belief that dog-sheep lookalikes regularly pass through the field,
then that belief would have been a defeater for my belief that there is a sheep in the
field.
So at least some defeater-deflectors work by preventing you from gaining some
belief D such that, if you were to hold D, D would be a defeater. However, there is a
second way that a belief can deflect an incoming defeater. Consider the following
variation of the dog-sheep case:
One day, you have a visual experience as of a sheep in the field. You form the
belief that there is a sheep in the field. I, whom you know to be the trustworthy
owner of this field, then mention to you that dog-sheep lookalikes frequent this
particular field. You believe what I tell you. However, you also recently
received some interesting information from a very reliable source: in this
geographical area, sheep and dog-sheep lookalikes always travel in pairs. The
canine follows the sheep to open, grassy pastures. There, the canine hunts for
small rodents in the tall grass, while the sheep grazes peacefully in the open
field without fear of predators. No dog-sheep lookalike is ever more than a few
yards from its sheep friend, and no sheep is ever more than a few yards from
its dog-sheep lookalike friend. As a result, you conclude that I have given you
no reason at all to give up your belief that there is a sheep in the field.
In this version of the case—unlike in Plantinga’s original version—you do come
to hold the belief that dog-sheep lookalikes frequent this field. However, in this
case, that new belief does not defeat your belief that there is a sheep in the field. For
you have another belief—the belief that if there is a dog-sheep lookalike in the field
then there is a sheep in the field and vice versa—that prevents your realization about
dog-sheep lookalikes frequenting this field from having any defeating force.
We can now distinguish between two kinds of defeater-deflectors: ‘‘neutralizing’’
deflectors, on the one hand, and ‘‘shielding’’ deflectors, on the other. Neutralizing
deflectors prevent some newly held belief from being a defeater. Shielding
deflectors, on the other hand, prevent you from coming to hold the potential
defeating belief at all.
A single belief can simultaneously serve as a neutralizing deflector and as a
shielding deflector. For example, your belief that sheep and dog-sheep lookalikes
always travel in pairs serves as both a neutralizing deflector and a shielding
deflector.
13 Plantinga (2011), p. 260.
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First, that belief neutralizes the potential defeating force of your newly held
belief that dog-sheep lookalikes frequent this field. Second, that belief shields you
from coming to believe that your belief that there is a sheep in the field is
insensitive. Since sheep are always accompanied by sheep-dog lookalikes and vice
versa, you reason, if there were no sheep in the field then neither would there have
been a dog-sheep lookalike in the field. And if there had neither been a sheep nor a
dog-sheep lookalike, you would not have believed that there is a sheep in the field.
Therefore, if there had been no sheep in the field then you would not have believed
that there is a sheep in the field.
3 Identity
Consider the following case:
You have a visual experience as of a green city. You form the belief that the
city is green. Incidentally, you also happen to know that ‘verde’ is Spanish for
‘green.’ And you have concluded from this that, for anything x, if x is green
then x’s being green is identical with x’s being verde. You then realize that
your green city experience—and thus your belief that the city is green—is
fully causally explained by the fact that the city is verde.
Call this the ‘‘Color Identity’’ case. It should be clear that your realization about the
origins of your green city experience does not give you any defeaters for your green
city belief. For your background belief, that if something is green then its being
green is identical with its being verde, is a defeater-deflector.
First, your verde-green identity belief is a neutralizing deflector. You have
realized that your green city belief is fully causally explained by the city’s being
verde. However, you also believe that, if the city is green, then its being green is
identical with its being verde. As a result, realizing that your green city belief is
causally explained by the city’s being verde is akin to realizing that your green city
belief is causally explained by the city’s being green. Since the latter belief has no
defeating force, neither does the former.
Second, your verde-green identity belief is a shielding deflector. In particular,
your verde-green identity belief prevents you from concluding that your green
city belief is insensitive to the facts about whether the city is green. Your verde-
green identity belief allows you to conclude that, necessarily, if the city had not
been green then it would not have been verde either. Moreover, if the city had
not been verde then you would not have believed that it is green. Therefore, you
can conclude, if the city had not been green you would not have believed it was
green.
Thus your identity belief serves to neutralize one potential threat of defeat and
shields you from another. More generally, given your verde-green identity belief, it
is hard to see how you could receive any defeaters merely as a result of realizing
that your green city belief is caused by the city’s being verde.
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Composition as Identity (or CAI) is the view that, for any xs, if the xs compose
an object O, then O is numerically identical with the xs.14 CAI states a general ‘‘law
of metaphysics’’—a general fact about how entities of one kind metaphysically
relate to entities of another kind (see Sect. 7). Specifically, CAI says that composite
objects bear the relation of numerical identity to their composing parts.
Notice that CAI does not imply anything about the conditions under which
composition occurs. So CAI does not, for example, imply that composition is
unrestricted. Neither does CAI imply, for example, that any microphysical particles
arranged baseball wise compose a baseball. For all CAI says, perhaps there are
particles arranged baseball wise but no baseballs.15
CAI does, however, have at least one important implication about what baseballs
would be like, if they existed—if there are baseballs, then they are identical with
things arranged baseball wise.16 Thus, given CAI, for any particles arranged
baseball wise, if those particles compose a baseball, then that baseball is identical
with those particles.
Now consider the following case:
You gaze upon a grassy field. It visually appears to you as if there is a
baseball, sitting in the grass. So you form the belief that there is a baseball.
This belief is prima facie justified for you. You also happen to accept CAI—
you believe that, for any xs, if the xs compose an O then O is numerically
identical with the xs. However, you then realize that your visual experience as
of a baseball is caused by a bunch of things, the bs, acting in concert.
Call this ‘‘the Baseball Identity’’ case. The original Baseball Case in Section I is just
like the Baseball Identity Case, except that you endorse CAI in the latter case but
not in the former. I shall argue that you gain no defeaters in the Baseball Identity
case.
14 I am focusing on ‘‘strong’’ CAI, on which putative composites are literally identical with their
composing parts, rather than so-called ‘‘weak’’ CAI, on which putative composites only bear some
composition-like relation to their composing parts. See Lewis (1991) for a defense of weak CAI and
Baxter (1988) for a defense of strong CAI.
15 Perhaps you think—as I do—that it would be objectionably arbitrary for an advocate of CAI to believe
in atoms arranged baseballwise but no baseballs. As Ross Cameron has argued, however, the truth of CAI
does not strictly entail unrestricted composition. This lack of entailment is all I am assuming here. See
Merricks (2005), Sider (2007) and Cameron (2012) for more on whether CAI entails unrestricted
composition.
16 Suppose that, following Markosian (1998), Parsons (2004) and McDaniel (2009), there could have been
qualitatively heterogeneous extended simples. Specifically, suppose that, possibly, some baseballs are
extended simples. Then it is false that the truth of CAI, all by itself, implies that baseballs are such that, if
they exist, they are identical with things arranged baseballwise. Instead, CAI only implies that, if there are
baseballs, then they are either identical with things arranged baseballwise or they are identical with simple
baseballs. Nevertheless, given the possibility of simple baseballs, CAI at least implies the following: if there
are composite baseballs, then composite baseballs are identical with things arranged baseballwise. And, in
the present context, the truth of that latter claim is all I need. For I am simply offering a rely to Merricks’
attempt to debunk our initially justified beliefs about the existence of composite material objects, such as
composite baseballs. Fans of CAI who also countenance the possibility of simple baseballs are thus invited
to read my claims about what baseballs would be like, if they existed, as implicitly restricted to composite
baseballs. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising the issue of extended simples.
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First, your realization that your visual experience as of a baseball is caused by the
bs does not, all by itself, serve as a defeater for your baseball belief. For your
acceptance of CAI serves as a neutralizing deflector—it neutralizes the threat of
defeat posed by your acceptance of that causal explanation.
For, if you accept CAI, then you should think that the baseball, if it exists, is
numerically identical with the bs. As a result, for you, realizing that the bs fully
causally explain something is akin to realizing that the baseball itself fully causally
explains something. So, for you, realizing that the bs fully causally explain why you
believe there is a baseball is akin to realizing that the baseball fully causally
explains why you believe there is a baseball. The latter belief surely does not defeat
your baseball belief. Thus, neither does the former belief.
Note that, in using CAI as a neutralizing deflector, you have not engaged in the
following form of reasoning. You have not started with the premise that the bs exist,
added the additional premise that CAI is true, and then concluded that the baseball
exists. To engage in that form of reasoning would be to give a philosophical
argument—an arguably invalid argument—for the existence of the baseball.
Such a CAI-based argument would, if it succeeded, providing you with a new
non-perceptual reason for believing that there is a baseball. What you are doing with
your belief in CAI, by contrast, is much more modest. You are merely using your
belief in CAI to deflect a potential defeater for your perceptually justified belief in
the existence of the baseball.
Second, your acceptance of CAI acts as a shielding deflector, which prevents you
from coming to think that your baseball belief is insensitive to the facts about whether
the baseball exists. To begin to see this, note that the relation of numerical identity
obeys the following principle of necessitation: necessarily, for any thing x, and for any
thing y, if x is identical with y then, necessarily, if y exists and is located at L then x
exists and is located at L. In other words, a thing’s existence and spatial location
supervenes, with necessity, upon the existence of that with which it is identical.17
You accept CAI. So you believe that, if there is a baseball, the baseball is
numerically identical with the bs. So you can now infer that the following is true of
the baseball and the bs: if there is a baseball then, necessarily, if the bs exist and are
located in the field then the baseball exists and is located in the field.18
17 Here is the plurally quantified analogue of this necessitation principle: for any things, the xs, and any
things, the ys, if the xs are identical with the ys then, necessarily, if the ys exist and are collectively
located at L then the xs exist and are collectively located at L.
18 Note that CAI plus this necessitation principle implies that, if the bs compose the baseball, the mere
existence of the bs—no matter how they are arranged—suffices for the existence of the baseball.
Restricted composition is the thesis that some things compose a further object, while others do not. Most
defenders of restricted composition will deny that, if the bs compose the baseball, then the mere existence
of the bs suffices for the existence of the baseball. Instead, they will claim, only the existence of the bs
together with the bs’ being arranged or structured baseballwise suffices for the existence of the baseball.
Thus—short of adopting contingent identity, four-dimensionalism, counterpart theory, or some other
controversial metaphysical thesis—defenders of restricted composition cannot make use of the CAI-based
deflection strategy. Fortunately, however, the two deflection strategies I outline in Sections IV and V
respectively do not have any such untoward modal implications. For an argument that CAI implies
mereological essentialism, see Merricks (1999). And for helpful discussion of CAI’s modal implications,
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You can also infer that the following counterfactual conditional is true: if there
had been no baseball in the field, then the bs either would not have existed or would
not have been located in the field.19 Moreover, if the bs had either not existed at all
or had not been located in the field, then there would have been nothing in the field
to cause you to believe that there is a baseball. Therefore, if there had been no
baseball in the field, you would not have believed that there is a baseball in the
field.20
Thus, if you accept CAI, you can conclude that your baseball belief is indeed
sensitive to the baseball facts.21 As a result, your belief in CAI serves as a shielding
deflector—once you have used CAI to make the relevant inferences, you ought not
believe the debunker’s claim that your baseball beliefs are insensitive to the baseball
facts.22
We have seen that your acceptance of CAI is both a neutralizing deflector and a
shielding deflector—it simultaneously removes the defeating threat posed by your
Footnote 18 continued
see Cameron (2012) and Cameron (2014). I am grateful to Kris McDaniel and an anonymous referee for
pressing me on this issue.
19 Mereological essentialism is the view that, necessarily, if object O exists and is composed of the xs
then, necessarily, if O exists then the xs exist and O is composed of the xs. Note that counterfactual
conditionals of the form ‘‘if the xs had not been here then object O would not have been here,’’ do not
imply mereological essentialism. For the truth of that counterfactual is consistent with there being
possible worlds in which O exists and the xs do not. In order for that counterfactual to be true, all that is
required is that those worlds are sufficiently distant from the actual world. Thanks to an anonymous
referee for discussion.
20 Suppose that the baseball, if it exists, is identical with the bs. And consider the following claim: the bs
exist but the baseball does not. That claim is not just false, it is necessarily false. For the identity facts
hold of necessity. As a result, any counterfactual with that claim as its antecedent is a counterpossible. For
example, ‘‘if the bs had existed and the baseball not existed then I still would have believed that there is a
baseball’’ is a counterpossible conditional. Call that claim The Counterpossible. On the traditional Lewis-
Stalnaker semantics, counterpossibles are all trivially true. So, on the traditional semantics, The
Counterpossible is trivially true. I deny, however, that conceding the truth of The Counterpossible
constitutes a defeater for my belief that there is a baseball. To see this, suppose I am justified in believing
that Nick exists. Suppose I am also justified in believing that Mr. Beans is identical with Nick. Given the
traditional Lewis-Stalnaker semantics, I can infer that the following counterpossible is true: if Mr. Beans
had existed and Nick had not existed, I still would have believed that Nick exists. Call this The Mr. Beans
Counterpossible. I accept that counterpossible. But accepting The Mr. Beans Counterpossible, so I say,
gives me no defeater for my belief that Nick exists. So, by the same token, conceding the truth of The
Counterpossible gives me no defeater for my belief that there is a baseball. Although, for a compelling
case against the traditional Lewis-Stalnaker approach to counterpossibles, see Tan forthcoming.
21 Korman forthcoming points out that defenders of composite objects might be tempted to employ this
form of reasoning to deflect away the insensitivity defeater. Ultimately, however, Korman argues that
once the defender of composite objects has conceded that there is a complete causal explanation of her
object experiences, she is no longer entitled to this necessitation principle. I argue in Section VI below
that defenders of composite objects are entitled to CAI. If I am right, defenders of composite objects who
accept CAI are indeed entitled to the relevant necessitation principle and can therefore legitimately
deflect the insensitivity defeater.
22 I am assuming that your belief in the truth of CAI is itself justified. After all, as I noted in footnote 12




realization about the causal source of your baseball belief, and it shields you from
acquiring the belief that your baseball belief is insensitive to the baseball facts.
It should also be clear that, if you accept CAI, your situation in the Baseball
Identity case is more analogous to your situation in the Color Identity case and less
analogous to your situation in Merricks’ original Emerald City case. In the Color
Identity case you do not, presumably, harbor any strange beliefs about the identity
of facts about the tint of your glasses with facts about the color of the city. In both
the Color Identity case and the Baseball Identity case, however, you do hold identity
beliefs that are capable of deflecting the incoming defeaters.
4 Reduction
Consider the following case:
You have a visual experience as of a green city. You form the belief that the
city is green. Incidentally, you also believe that, in general, if something x has
a determinable property D then x’s being D is reducible to its having some
determinate of D. In other words, you believe that if some x is D then what it
is for x to be D is for x to have some determinate of D. You also believe the
following instance of that general principle: for any x, if x is green in color,
then what it is for x to be green is for it to be some specific shade of green.
However, you then realize that green city experiences—and thus your belief
that the city is green—is fully causally explained by the fact that the city is
emerald in color.
Call this the ‘‘Color Reduction’’ case. It should be clear that your realization about
the origins of your green city experience does not give you any defeaters for your
green city belief. For your background ‘‘reduction’’ belief, the belief that if
something x is green in color then what it is for x to be green is for it to be some
specific shade of green, serves as a defeater-deflector.
First, your reduction belief is a neutralizing deflector. You have realized that your
green city belief is fully causally explained by the city’s being emerald. However,
your reduction belief allows you to conclude that, if the city is green, then what it is
for the city to be green is for it to be some specific shade of green. As a result, if the
city is green, what it is for the fact that it is green to cause you to believe it is green
just is for the fact that it is some specific shade of green to cause you to believe it is
green. Thus, if the city is green, for you to realize that the city’s being emerald
causes your green city belief is just for you to realize that your green city belief is
caused by the very fact constitutive of what it is for the city to be green.
Second, your reduction belief is a shielding deflector, preventing you from
conceding that your green city belief is insensitive. For reducible facts are
necessitated by those facts to which they are reduced. So you should think that if the
city had not been green then it would not have been emerald. Moreover, if the city
had not been emerald then you would not have believed it was green. Thus, you can
conclude, if the city had not been green you would not have believed it was green.
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Thus your reduction belief serves to neutralize one potential threat of defeat and
shields you from forming a belief that would be a defeater if you had formed it.
More generally, given your emerald-green reduction belief, it is hard to see how you
could receive any defeaters merely as a result of realizing that your green city belief
is caused by the city’s being emerald.
Whole-Part Reductionism (WPR) is the thesis that, for any xs, if the xs compose
an object O, then the fact that O exists is reduced to facts exclusively about the
existence and arrangement of the xs. Equivalently, for any xs, if the xs compose
object O, then what it is for O to exist just is for the xs to exist and be suitably
arranged.23
Three points of clarification about WPR.
First, as formulated above, WPR implies that the reduction relation at least
sometimes takes facts, such as the fact that object O exists, as its relata. This
implication is somewhat controversial. After all, perhaps there are no such things as
facts. Or perhaps, even if there are facts, the reduction relation takes only objects,
rather than facts, as its relata. Fortunately, WPR has a fact-free analogue, which I
formulate in a footnote.24 Those who deny that facts can be the relata of reduction
are invited to make use of the fact-free analogue of the WPR.
Second, note that WPR takes no stand on the nature of the reduction relation
itself. Perhaps fact x’s being reduced to fact y is a matter of x’s having a ‘‘real
definition’’ in terms of y.25 Or perhaps x’s being reduced to y is a matter of y’s being
a constituent in x’s essence.26 Or perhaps both the reduction relation and its relata
are linguistic or propositional entities. For example, perhaps for x to be reduced to y
is for statements of the form ‘x exists’ to analytically or conceptually entail
statements of the form ‘y exists.’27 WPR only requires that, in some sense or other,
what it is for the fact that a composite object exists to obtain for facts about the
existence and arrangement of the xs to also obtain.
Third, note that WPR, like CAI, has no direct implications about the conditions
under which composition does and does not occur. For example, the mere truth of
WPR, all by itself, does not settle whether the bs compose a baseball. Indeed, WPR
alone does not settle whether the bs compose anything at all. All WPR simply
implies is that if the bs compose something, such as a baseball, then that baseball’s
existing is reduced to the bs’ existing and being arranged baseball wise.
WPR does, however, entail the truth of the following principle:
23 If composition is unrestricted, then the xs are ‘‘appropriately arranged’’ just in virtue of their existing.
If composition is restricted, on the other hand, then the xs are appropriately arranged in virtue of only
certain relations between the xs.
24 Here is an object-reduction version of WPR: for any xs, if the xs compose an object O, then object O
itself is reduced to the xs themselves and how they are arranged. Equivalently, for any xs, if the xs
compose object O, then object O just is the xs and their arrangement. I am grateful to an anonymous
referee for prompting me to think more carefully about the question of reduction’s relata and that
question’s relevance to my arguments in this section.
25 See Rosen (2015) and Dorr (2017) on real definition.




Property Reduction for any xs, if the xs compose some object O, then if O is
F then the fact that O is F is reduced to some fact or facts about the properties
of and interrelations among the xs.28
Property Reduction says that every fact about a given composite object is reduced to
some fact or facts about that object’s composing parts and interrelations among
those parts. Here is a brief defense of my claim that WPR entails Property
Reduction.
Suppose that Property Reduction is false. For example, suppose the fact that O is
F is not reduced to any fact or combination of facts about the xs. Now, if the fact
that O is F is reduced to any facts whatsoever—as opposed to being completely
irreducible—presumably the fact that O is F is reduced to some fact or combination
of facts about its composing parts, the xs. Therefore, the fact that O is F is a
completely irreducible fact about O.
Plausibly, for any entity x and property F, if x is F and the fact that x is F is an
irreducible fact about x then the fact that x exists is irreducible as well. That is, x’s
existence is reducible only if every fact about x is reducible. We just saw that the
fact that O is F is an irreducible fact about O. It follows that the fact that O exists is
also an irreducible fact. But WPR says that, for any object whatsoever, the fact that
that object exists is a reducible fact. Therefore, WPR is false.
We began by supposing that Property Reduction is false. And we just concluded
that WPR is false. Therefore, if Property Reduction is false then WPR is false. By
contraposition, if WPR is true then Property Reduction is true. So WPR entails
Property Reduction.
Suppose that, as Merricks argues, a composite object causes an effect E only if
that object’s microphysical parts jointly cause E. And suppose that WRP—and thus
Property Reduction—is true. Then, plausibly, for any object O composed of some
xs, if O causes E then O’s causing E is reduced to the xs’ jointly causing E. In other
words, what it is for an object to cause an effect just is for its parts to jointly cause
that effect.29
Now consider the following case:
You gaze upon a grassy field. It visually appears to you as if there is a
baseball, sitting in the grass. So you form the belief that there is a baseball.
28 An anonymous referee has pointed out that this principle may need to be restricted to qualitative facts,
i.e. facts about the instantiation of qualitative properties by composite object O and facts about the
instantiation of qualitative properties by O’s parts, the xs. Readers who find this restricted version of the
Property Reduction principle more plausible are invited to make the relevant substitutions.
29 In Merricks (2001), pp. 67–69, Merricks considers and rejects the claim that what it is for an object to
cause an effect just is for its composing parts to jointly cause that effect. For, he argues, this would
involve an objectionable form of circularity—one set of causal facts would be analyzed as another set of
causal facts. Suppose that what it is for O to be F is for the xs to be F, and that what it is for the xs to be F
is for O to be F. And suppose that O and the xs are non-identical. Then, perhaps, there would be
objectionable circularity in the reduction of causal facts about O to causal facts about the xs. However,
WPR does not imply that causal facts about parts are reduced to causal facts about the wholes they
compose. For all WPR says, perhaps what it is for O to be F is for the xs to be F, and yet it is no part of the
xs being F that O is F. Indeed, I think the fan of WPR should take Merricks’ circularity concern as a
reason to hold that causal facts about wholes are asymmetrically reduced to causal facts about their parts.
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This belief is prima facie justified for you. You also happen to accept WPR—
you believe that, for any xs, if the xs compose an O then what it is for O to
exist is for there to be some xs appropriately arranged. However, you then
realize that your visual experience as of a baseball is caused by a bunch of
things, the bs, acting in concert.
Call this the ‘‘Baseball Reduction’’ case. The original Baseball case in Section I is
just like the Baseball Reduction case, except that you endorse WPR in the latter case
but not in the former. In the Baseball Reduction case, your belief in WPR prevents
you from gaining any defeaters for your baseball belief.
First, your realization that your visual experience as of a baseball is caused by the
bs does not, all by itself, serve as a defeater for your baseball belief. For your
acceptance of WPR serves as a neutralizing deflector—it neutralizes the threat of
defeat posed by your acceptance of that causal explanation.
Since you accept WPR, you also realize that, if there is a baseball, what it is for
the baseball to cause you to believe there is a baseball is for the bs to cause you to
believe there is a baseball. As a result, you can realize that, if there is a baseball, the
very facts that cause you to believe there is a baseball are the very facts that
constitute what it is for the baseball to cause you to have that belief. And surely that
realization, all by itself, gives you no defeater for your baseball belief.
Of course, in relying on WPR in this way, you are not giving a WPR-based
argument for the existence of the baseball. Given that WPR is neutral with regard to
when composition occurs, such an argument would be invalid anyway. Instead, you
are doing something much more modest with your belief in WPR: you are using that
belief to deflect the incoming defeater for your baseball belief, which was already
prima facie justified by your perceptual experience.
Second, your acceptance of WPR is a shielding deflector—it prevents you from
concluding that your baseball belief is insensitive to the facts about whether there is
a baseball. For an entity x’s existing is reduced to some other entities, the ys,
existing and being appropriately arranged only if the ys’ existing and being
appropriately arranged necessitates x’s existence.30 This necessitation principle, like
the necessitation principle governing CAI, allows you to conclude that if there had
been no baseball in the field, then neither would there have been any things arranged
baseball wise in the field causing you to have a baseball experience. Therefore, you
can conclude, your baseball belief is not insensitive to whether or not there is a
baseball in the field.
So WPR can serve as both a neutralizing deflector, neutralizing the otherwise
defeating force of your realization about the causal origins of your baseball
30 Note that this necessitation principle, unlike CAI’s necessitation principle, does not imply that the
existence of the baseball supervenes on the mere existence of the bs alone. Instead, WPR is compatible
with the more intuitive view that existence of the baseball supervenes on both the bs’ existing and their
being appropriately arranged. Perhaps, as some defenders of unrestricted composition think, the bs’ being
appropriately arranged just is the bs merely existing. Or perhaps, as many defenders of restricted
composition think, there is some uniquely baseball-shaped way of arranging the bs. Thanks to an
anonymous referee for helpful discussion on this point.
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experience, and as a shielding deflector, shielding you from concluding that your
baseball belief is insensitive to whether there is a baseball.
It should now be clear that your situation in the Baseball Reduction case is more
analogous to your situation in the Color Reduction case and less analogous to your
situation in the Emerald City case. In the Emerald City case you do not, presumably,
harbor any strange beliefs about the reducibility of facts about the tint of your
glasses to facts about the city’s color. In both the Color Reduction case and the
Baseball Reduction case, however, you do harbor certain reduction beliefs poised to
deflect the incoming defeaters.
5 Common explanation
Consider another case:
You receive a mysterious package in the mail. Inside, you find a pair of glasses, a
large envelope, and the following note:
‘‘Welcome to SYNC, a new experimental project in the epistemology of
perception. Before proceeding any further, please put on the glasses we have
provided. In the envelope, you should find a lightweight digital screen, which
has one function: to display an image of a city. In order to understand the
SYNC project, you need to know two things.
First, your glasses are tinted one of four possible colors: red, green, yellow, or
blue. As you’ll soon discover, the color of the tint changes from one day to the
next. However, these changes are determined by a completely random process.
Here at SYNC Headquarters, a computer algorithm randomly generates one of
four primary color words every day at midnight—‘red’, ‘green’, ‘yellow’, or
‘blue.’ Then the SYNC computer, via an instant wireless signal, will cause the
tint of your glasses to change color. The computer always bases its signals on
which color word was generated that day. So, for example, every day the word
‘green’ is generated, the computer will send a signal causing your glasses to
have a green tint.
Second, the color of the digital city image changes each night at midnight as
well. In fact, the same computer here at SYNC headquarters that will be
causing the color of your glasses to change will also wirelessly control the
color of the image each day. Crucially, the very same color word that
determines which signal the computer will send to the glasses will also
determine which signal is sent to the screen. So, for example, if the day’s color
word is ‘green’, the computer will send a signal to the screen that causes the
image to turn green.
Since both signals are based on the same color word each day, you can always
be sure that the color of the image will match the tint of your glasses.’’
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You believe everything the note tells you. The next day, you put the SYNC
glasses on and look at the digital image on the screen. The image of the city
appears green to you. You form the belief that there is a green image of a city
before you. However, remembering what you read in the note, you then realize
something: your experience as of a green image—and thus your belief that there
is a green image of a city before you—is fully causally explained by a color word,
‘green’, which was randomly generated by a computer at SYNC Headquarters.
Call this the SYNC case. It should be clear that your realization about the origins of
your green city belief gives you no defeaters for that belief. For, having read the
note and having believed everything it says, you also have a ‘‘common explanation’’
belief, which has the following content: [The city’s being green and your believing
it is green are both explained by the randomly generated word ‘green’]. That
common explanation belief serves as a defeater-deflector.
First, your common explanation belief serves as a neutralizing deflector. You
have realized that your green city belief is fully causally explained by the randomly
generated word ‘green’. Absent any other beliefs, this realization might well have
been a defeater for your green city belief. However, you also believe that, if the city
is green, its being green is caused by the randomly generated word ‘green’. So when
you realize the causal origin of your green city belief, you are merely learning that,
if the city is green, then your green city belief is caused by the very same facts that
cause the city to be green.
Look at it this way. If you learn that your green city belief is completely caused
by some facts that do not, all by themselves, constitute good evidence for thinking
the city is green then you would indeed have a defeater for your green city belief.
On the other hand, if you learn that your green city belief is completely caused by
some facts that are good evidence for thinking the city is green, then you gain no
defeater.
But the fact that the computer generated the word ‘green’ is good evidence that
the city is green. And so, when you realize that your green city belief is caused by
the randomly generated word ‘green’, you have simply realized that your green city
belief is caused by some facts that are good evidence for its truth. And so that
realization gives you no defeater.
Second, your realizing that your green city belief is caused by the randomly
generated word ‘green’ shields you from coming to hold that your green city belief
is insensitive to the green city facts. To see this, first note if the city had not been
green then the computer would not have randomly picked the word ‘green.’ And if
the computer had not randomly picked ‘green,’ then the tint on your glasses would
not have been green. And if the tint on your glasses had not been green, then you
would not have believed that the city is green. Therefore, you can conclude, if the
city had not been green then you would not have believed that it is green.
More generally, given your common explanation belief, it is hard to see how the
realization that your green city belief is caused by the randomly generated word
‘green’ could give rise to any defeaters for your green city belief.
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Priority Pluralism (PP) is the view that, for any xs, if the xs compose an object O,
then O is fully grounded in the xs and their arrangement.31 PP—like both CAI and
WPR—has no implications about which things compose a further object, nor does it
have any implications about which composites there are. Specifically, PP does not
imply that atoms arranged baseball wise compose something. Neither does it imply
that baseball B exists.
PP does have one important implication, however. Metaphysical grounding is an
explanatory relation. Thus, if y fully grounds x, then x exists because of or in virtue
of y’s existing. So PP implies that, if some xs compose an O, then O is
metaphysically explained by there being some xs appropriately arranged.32
In light of the above, consider the following case:
You gaze upon a grassy field. It visually appears to you as if there is a
baseball, sitting in the grass. So you form the belief that there is a baseball.
This belief is prima facie justified for you. You also happen to accept PP—you
believe that, for any xs, if the xs compose an O, then O is fully grounded in the
xs and their being appropriately arranged. However, you realize that your
visual experience as of a baseball is caused by a bunch of things, the bs, acting
in concert.
Call this the ‘‘Baseball Grounding’’ case. The original Baseball case in Section I is
just like the Baseball Grounding case, except that you endorse PP in the latter case
but not in the former. I shall argue that you gain no defeaters in the Baseball
Grounding case.33
First, your realization that your visual experience as of a baseball is caused by the
bs does not, all by itself, serve as a defeater for your baseball belief. For your
acceptance of PP serves as a neutralizing deflector—it neutralizes the threat of
defeat posed by your acceptance of that causal explanation.
You have realized that your baseball belief is fully caused by the bs. Absent any
other beliefs, this realization might have been a defeater for your baseball belief.
31 Defenders of priority pluralism include Cameron (2014), Skiles (2015) and Saenz (2015) among
others. Priority pluralism’s main rival is priority monism, defended by Jonathan Schaffer in Schaffer
(2009, 2010a, b, 2012).
32 There is a dispute about whether the grounding relation is itself an explanatory relation or whether,
instead, the grounding serves as a metaphysical ‘‘backing’’ relation for explanatory linguistic items like
sentences or propositions. None of this paper’s main arguments turn on which of these two views is
correct—defenders of the ‘‘backing’’ view are thus invited to substitute, wherever appropriate, their
preferred way of phrasing explanatory claims. Fine (2012), Dasgupta (2014) and Litland (2015) defend
the view that grounding is itself an explanatory relation, while Audi (2012a, b) and Kim (1994) defend
versions of the backing view.
33 Gideon Rosen in Rosen (2010) defends the Grounding-Reduction Link, according to which any entity
x that is reduced to some entity y (or the ys) is also fully grounded in y (or the ys). If grounding is
compatible with reduction in this way, then PP may be compatible with WPR. Call the conjunction of PP
and WPR ‘‘Reductive Priority Pluralism.’’ If you accept Reductive Priority Pluralism, then Section IV’s
strategy of using reduction beliefs as defeater-deflectors is available to you. However, if you, like me,
think that composite objects are both fully grounded in their parts but are nevertheless irreducible to them,
then you cannot make use of Section IV’s reduction strategy. You can, however, make use of the common
explanation strategy outlined and defended here in Section V. See Audi (2012a, b) for doubts about the
compatibility of reduction and grounding.
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However, you also believe PP. So you can infer that the baseball, if it exists, is fully
grounded in the bs and their arrangement. Since grounding is a form of
metaphysical explanation, you can infer that the baseball, if it exists, exists
because or in virtue of the existence and arrangement of the bs.
So your realization about the causal origin of your baseball belief amounts to a
realization that, if there is a baseball, the very facts that causally explain your baseball
belief are among the facts that metaphysically explain why the baseball exists. Surely
that realization, all by itself, does not threaten to defeat your baseball belief.
Or look at it this way. Surely you gain no defeater by learning that your baseball
belief is completely causally explained by some facts the obtaining of which are
good evidence for there being a baseball, if indeed there is a baseball. But, given
your belief in PP, you should think that the existence and arrangement of the bs are
good evidence for the existence of the baseball, if indeed there is a baseball. So
nothing you have learned gives you a defeater.
Your acceptance of PP is also a shielding deflector—it prevents you from
concluding that your baseball belief is insensitive to the facts about whether there is
a baseball. For the existence of a grounded entity is necessitated by its full
grounds.34 Once you recognize that the existence of the baseball is necessitated in
this way then, as we saw in Sect. 4 above, it would be impermissible of you to
concede that your baseball belief is insensitive to the baseball facts.
Two points of clarification about your reliance upon PP as a defeater-deflector.
First, as in the case of CAI and WPR, you are not giving a PP-based argument for
the existence of the baseball. Given that PP is neutral about when composition
occurs, such an argument would be invalid anyway. Instead, you are merely relying
on PP to deflect the incoming defeater for your antecedently justified baseball belief.
Second, PP, as stated, does not entail anything about whether baseballs have any
causal powers. It is consistent with PP that baseballs are such that, if they exist, they
are epiphenomenal or causally inert. Nevertheless, I have just argued that you can
rely on the truth of PP as a defeater-deflector. In other words, I have argued that you
can preserve your baseball belief from defeat even if you do not think the baseball
plays any role in the complete causal explanation of your baseball belief.35
It should also be clear that your situation in the Baseball Grounding case is more
analogous to your situation in the SYNC case than it is to your situation in the
Emerald City case. In the Emerald City case you do not, presumably, harbor any
strange beliefs about there being some common explanation of the tint of your
glasses and the facts about the city’s color. In both the SYNC case and the Baseball
Grounding case, however, you do harbor certain beliefs about common explanation
that are in each case poised to deflect the incoming defeaters.
34 Although Skiles (2015) and Leuenberger 2014 deny that grounding is necessitating. See Trogdon
(2013) for discussion.
35 Contra Korman and Locke forthcoming, who argue that conceding that the fact that p plays no
explanatory role in one’s p belief is generally a defeater for one’s belief that p. Whether such an
‘‘explanatory concession’’ is a defeater, so I have been arguing, depends on whether one also thinks the





The ‘‘laws of metaphysics,’’ or ‘‘metaphysical laws’’ are general facts about which
metaphysical relations entities of one sort bear to entities of another sort.36 As I am
using the phrase ‘‘metaphysical laws,’’ general facts about what is numerically
identical with what count as laws of metaphysics. General facts about what is
reduced to what, and general facts about what is metaphysically grounded in what,
also count as metaphysical laws.
Metaphysical laws have the logical form of universal generalizations.37 As a
result, they are existentially neutral in an important way. For example, suppose it is
a law of metaphysics that every human person is identical with some human animal.
All that law says is that, for any x, if x is a human person then x is identical with
some human animal. This is the sense in which this alleged law about personal
identity is existentially neutral with regard to which persons exist.
Each of the above views about the relationship between composite objects and
their composing parts alleges that some law of metaphysics obtains. According to
CAI, it is a law of metaphysics that every composite object, if it exists, is identical
with its parts. According to WPR, it is a law of metaphysics that every composite
object, if it exists, is reduced to its parts. And according to PP, it is a law of
metaphysics that every composite object, if it exists, is fully grounded in its parts.
I have, then, been arguing that our beliefs about the obtaining of certain
metaphysical laws can serve as defeater-deflectors. Our beliefs about what
metaphysical laws obtain can both neutralize the potential defeating power of a
realization about the causal origins of one’s belief, and they can shield us from
acquiring beliefs that would, if accepted, serve as defeaters. This is the common
thread running through the last three sections of this paper.
Moreover, the existential neutrality of metaphysical laws is what makes it
possible to rely upon one’s belief CAI, WPR, or PP as a defeater-deflector without
thereby begging the question against the perceptual debunker. To see this, it may
help to contrast the strategy of using our beliefs about metaphysical laws as
defeater-deflectors with a case in which one’s reliance upon some belief as a
defeater-deflector is inarguably question-begging or otherwise illicit.
Consider the following case:
I have a strong apparent memory of seeing my coworker, Jim, emerging from
a phone booth in a red cape and blue suit and then flying off into the clear blue
sky. On the basis of this remarkable apparent memory, I have formed two
beliefs. First, I believe that Superman exists. Second, and in part on the basis
36 See Sider (2011), Dasgupta (2016), Wasserman (2015), Wilsch 2016, Rosen (2017b), Schaffer (2017,
and Glazier 2016) for more on the laws of metaphysics.
37 Those with Humean inclinations will think the laws of metaphysics are mere universal generalizations,
in the same way that ‘‘all ravens are black’’ is a universal generalization. Non-Humeans, on the other
hand, will think the ‘‘it is a law of metaphysics that’’ operator transforms a universal generalization into a
law-like fundamental fact. I shall remain neutral between these two conceptions of the laws of
metaphysics. The only thing that matters, for my purposes, is that the metaphysical laws are existentially
neutral in the sense to be specified later in this section.
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of my belief that Superman exists, I believe that Superman is identical with
Jim. However, one day a friend shows me an old recording of an office party.
In the recording, Jim reveals to the office that he is also a professional
hypnotist. I volunteer for an impromptu hypnotism demonstration. The
recording then shows Jim hypnotizing me and, speaking very slowly, telling
me that, whenever I awake, I will have a vivid memory of Jim dressed as
superman and flying through the sky. After the recording ends, I refuse to give
up my belief that Superman exists. ‘‘After all,’’ I reason, ‘‘Superman is
identical with Jim. Clearly, Jim caused me to believe that Superman exists.
Therefore, I conclude, Superman caused me to believe that Superman
exists!’’38
Clearly, my reliance upon my identity belief—the belief that Superman is identical
with Jim—as a defeater-deflector is objectionably circular, question-begging, or
otherwise illicit.
First, notice that the proposition that Superman is identical with Jim—perhaps
together with the proposition that Jim exists—just entails that Superman exists.
Given that I am in a position to see that this entailment holds, when I receive a
potential defeater for my belief that Superman exists, my justification for believing
that Superman is identical with Jim is threatened as well.
Second, my identity belief and my belief that Superman exists have the same
justificatory source. For I inferred my identity belief, in part, from my belief that
Superman exists. However, my belief that Superman exists was produced and
initially justified by my apparent memory. So both beliefs derive their justification,
at least in part, from that memory. Therefore, when I receive a potential defeater for
my belief that Superman exists, the justification for my identity belief is threatened
as well.
Thus, when I realize the true origins of my apparent memory, that realization
does not only threaten to undermine my justification for believing that Superman
exists. In addition, that realization poses a threat to my justification for believing
that Superman is identical with Jim. As a result, in relying upon my identity belief
as a defeater-deflector, I am thereby relying upon one of the very beliefs whose
justificatory status is threatened with defeat by the putative defeater. In this context,
at least, it is impermissible of me to do so.
Is it always similarly illicit to rely upon some belief b as a defeater-deflector for a
potential defeater D, when D also threatens to undermine one’s justification for
believing b? This question has no uncontroversial answer.39 Fortunately, and unlike
some other extant replies to the debunker, my proposed strategy for deflecting the
debunker’s putative defeaters does not require us to take a stand on this
38 This is a variant of a case originally formulated by Daniel Korman in his comments on an earlier draft
of this paper at the Central APA 2017.
39 Andrew Moon dubs a principle completely prohibiting the use of ‘‘threatened’’ beliefs as defeater-
deflectors the ‘‘Anti-Circularity Principle.’’ He offers some interesting and compelling counterexamples




controversial issue in the epistemology of defeaters.40 For, in contrast with the
Superman case, the content and justification of our beliefs about which metaphys-
ical laws obtain are sufficiently independent of the content and justification of our
beliefs about which objects exist.
Your belief that there is a baseball is prima facie justified by your perceptual
experience as of a baseball. Furthermore, suppose you believe that CAI is true. Add
that you have been convinced by the debunker that my baseball experience is fully
causally explained by the joint work of some particles arranged baseball wise. This
realization about the origins of your baseball experience threatens to serve as a
defeater for your baseball belief. However, the justificatory status of your belief that
CAI is true is not likewise threatened by your realization.
First recall that the truth of CAI—even together with the proposition that there
are some things arranged baseball wise—does not logically entail that there is a
baseball. Instead, CAI is existentially neutral with respect to when composition does
or does not occur. CAI simply says that, for any xs, if they compose an object O then
O is identical with the xs. So the mere logical relations between the content of the
beliefs alone gives you no reason to conclude that any threat to your baseball belief
doubles as a threat to your belief in CAI.
Second, your belief that CAI is true does not share a common justificatory source
with your belief that there is a baseball. You did not, for example, rely upon your
perceptual belief that there is a baseball in order to infer that CAI is true. Nor is your
belief in CAI’s truth somehow immediately produced by any sensory experience of
yours.
In general, our beliefs in CAI and other laws of metaphysics are justified a priori
rather than perceptually—for example, perhaps they are justified via intellectual
seemings, rational intuitions, or something else. For example, many have argued for
CAI, WPR, and PP on the grounds that these theories are more ontologically
parsimonious than their rivals. Plausibly, neither our acceptance of certain
principles of parsimony or economy nor our beliefs about which theories are
parsimonious are justified on the basis of sense experience.
Perhaps the debunker would deny that a priori knowledge is possible. Or perhaps
she thinks that, although a priori knowledge is possible, our beliefs about which
laws of metaphysics obtain are, despite my claims to the contrary, ultimately based
at least in part on the same sources of evidence that justify our existential beliefs
about which composite objects exist. Or perhaps the debunker can mount an
independent debunking argument targeting our otherwise a priori justified beliefs
about which laws of metaphysics obtain.41
I do not know whether the debunker can eventually mount a plausible defense of
one or more these claims. However, it is important to note that the burden of proof is
40 As Korman and Lock forthcoming and Moon (2017) argue, the ‘‘third-factor’’ or ‘‘minimalist’’
responses to the moral debunking arguments seem to rely upon beliefs as defeater-deflectors despite those
beliefs’ own justification being threatened with defeat. Third-factor replies are defended by Berker
(2014), Clarke-Doane (2015), and Enoch (2010).
41 For example, see Miller and Norton (2017) for a debunking argument targeting our beliefs about what
grounds what.
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on the debunker. Until the debunker shoulders that burden, we may permissibly rely
upon our beliefs about metaphysical laws as a defeater-deflector without thereby
begging the question against the debunker.42
7 Generalizing the strategy
Let a moral belief be a belief about which moral facts obtain. For example, the
belief that it is always wrong to cause unnecessary harm to one’s friends and family
is a moral belief. Our moral beliefs, no less than our beliefs about which composite
objects exist, are the targets of debunking arguments. The moral debunking
arguments usually focus on the evolutionary etiology of our moral beliefs.43
According to the debunker, we are predisposed to hold certain moral beliefs in
certain contexts. When we encounter certain natural facts in our immediate
environment, such as the event of one person causing another person to suffer
unnecessarily, those predispositions produce occurrent moral beliefs. However, the
debunker argues, we have these predispositions to form moral beliefs solely because
it was conducive to the survival and reproduction of our evolutionary ancestors to
hold certain moral beliefs in certain circumstances. For example, perhaps it was
conducive to the survival and reproduction of our ancestors for them to believe that
the causing of unnecessary harm to a friend or family member is always morally
wrong.
So, according to the debunker, the complete proximate and historical causal
explanation of why we have the moral beliefs we do involves only natural or non-
moral facts. The debunker concedes that we are at least prima facie justified in
holding the moral beliefs we do. Nevertheless, she contends, once we realize that
our moral beliefs are completely explained by the natural facts, we have thereby
gained a defeater for those moral beliefs.
Suppose moral realism is true.44 There are broadly two options regarding the
metaphysical relationship between the moral facts and the natural facts, given moral
realism. First, perhaps the moral facts supervene upon the natural facts, but do so
42 Suppose I inferred that the baseball is identical with some atoms arranged baseballwise from my belief
in CAI together with my belief that there is a baseball. Then my realization about the origins of my
baseball experience would threaten my justification for believing that the baseball is identical with some
particles arranged baseball-wise. At least arguably, it would therefore be illicit of me to rely on that
identity belief as a defeater-deflector. However, this is not the belief I am proposing you use as a defeater-
deflector. The belief you are using as is one you can directly infer from CAI: if the particles arranged
baseballwise compose a baseball then the baseball is identical with those particles.
43 See Joyce (2006) and Street (2006) for two important defenses of moral debunking arguments. And
see Wielenberg (2010), Enoch (2010), Berker (2014), Clarke-Doane (2015), Moon forthcoming, Korman
forthcoming, and Korman and Locke forthcoming for discussion.
44 There are two reasons I have chosen to focus on the moral realist rather than the moral antirealist.
First, I suspect most moral antirealist do not believe there are any general metaphysical laws governing
the relationship between moral and natural facts. Second, evolutionary debunking arguments are—at least
arguably—a greater threat to the moral realist than the moral antirealist. The moral antirealist can simply
concede that the moral facts play no explanatory role in the genesis of our moral beliefs. After all, part of
what it is to be an antirealist is to think that our moral beliefs (and moral attitudes, more generally)
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‘‘brutely’’ or not in virtue of any non-modal relationship between the moral and the
natural.45 Second, perhaps the moral facts both supervene upon and are, in some
sense or other, constituted by certain natural facts. Call this second version of moral
realism ‘‘Metaethical Naturalism.’’
Different versions of Metaethical Naturalism postulate different general laws
about how moral facts relate to their subvening natural facts. For example, Identity
Naturalism says the following law of metaphysics obtains: if moral fact M obtains
then there is some natural fact N (or natural facts, the Ns) with which M is
numerically identical. Similarly, let Reductive Naturalism be the view that the
following law of metaphysics obtains: if moral fact M obtains, then there is some
natural fact N (or natural facts, the Ns) to which M is reducible. Finally, let Priority
Naturalism be the view that the following law of metaphysics obtains: if moral fact
M obtains, then there is some natural fact N (or natural facts, the Ns) that fully
grounds M.46
Now suppose you are a moral realist who believes that at least one moral fact
obtains. Add that you also accept either Identity Naturalism, Reductive Naturalism,
or Priority Naturalism. Finally, suppose you realize that the evolutionary debunker’s
story is true—your moral beliefs really are fully causally explained by certain
natural facts in your immediate environment together with your evolutionarily-
conditioned predispositions. Have you thereby gained any defeaters for your moral
beliefs?
Whether you have gained any defeaters depends on two things—which natural
facts are a part of the debunker’s story, and which natural facts are mentioned in the
metaphysical law you believe obtains. If the very natural facts that are mentioned in
the relevant metaphysical law are also an essential part of the debunker’s
explanation of your moral beliefs, then you have gained no defeaters for your moral
beliefs.
To see this more clearly suppose, following David Enoch, that the debunker’s
evolutionary explanation makes essential reference to facts about what does and
does not contribute to the survival and flourishing of individual human beings and of
human communities. Also suppose you believe that, for any moral fact M, if M
obtains then M is either identical with, reducible to, or fully grounded in facts about
the survival and flourishing of individual humans and human communities.47
In that case, when you learn that your moral beliefs are fully causally explained
by facts about what is and is not conducive to the survival and flourishing of
individual human beings and their communities, you have not thereby gained any
Footnote 44 continued
determine what the moral facts are, and not the other way around. Indeed, this is why moral debunking
arguments are sometimes framed as arguments for antirealism. See, most notably, Street (2006).
45 G.E. Moore’s view that normative properties are fundamental or sui generis properties that
nevertheless modally co-vary with certain underlying natural properties is probably an instance of this
version of moral realism. See Moore (1903).
46 See Rosen (2017a) for an exposition of various versions of Priority Naturalism and Berker
forthcoming for criticism.
47 Enoch (2010), Section 5.3.
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defeaters for your moral beliefs. After all, you can reason, if there are any moral
facts, the moral facts are either identical with, reduced to, or are fully grounded in
facts about what is and is not conducive to the survival and flourishing of individual
human beings and their communities.
In other words, your epistemic situation upon accepting the debunker’s
evolutionary explanation of your moral beliefs is relevantly like the epistemic
situation of an advocate of CAI, WPR, or PP upon accepting that his or her object
beliefs are fully causally explained by facts about those objects’ putative parts. In
both cases, belief in the obtaining of the relevant metaphysical law serves to deflect
the force of the incoming defeater.
However, it is worth briefly noting that while the metaphysical laws deflection
strategy is available to defenders of material objects of various stripes, that strategy
may not be as uniformly available to every version of Metaethical Naturalism.
Most candidates for general laws about the relationship between parts and wholes
include a plural quantifier ranging over all putative composers, the xs. Moreover,
any plausible debunking explanation of our object beliefs will make reference to the
causal activities of those same putative composers. As a result, it is almost
inevitable that there should be some overlap between the content of the
metaphysical laws, whatever they are, and the entities referenced in the debunking
explanation. The inevitability of such overlap is what makes the proposed strategy
available to defenders of CAI, WPR, and PP alike.
However, only some metaethical naturalists—those whose laws mention natural
facts about the survival and flourishing of oneself, one’s family, and one’s
immediate community—postulate metaphysical laws whose content overlaps in the
right way with the natural facts postulated in the debunker’s evolutionary
explanation. Other moral naturalists, by contrast, may prefer metaphysical laws
that do not sufficiently overlap with the facts mentioned in the debunker’s
explanation.
Specifically, laws that identify, reduce, or ground the moral facts exclusively in
third-personal and agent-neutral natural facts may be particularly ill-suited to serve
as defeater-deflectors. For example, consider a metaethical naturalism who believes
we are equally obligated to give our time and resources to strangers and those who
are spatially distant from us as we are to give our time and resources to friends and
family. Such a metaethical naturalist may have difficulty using his or her preferred
moral laws to deflect the debunker’s potential defeater. Those who think morality is
supremely demanding in some other way may have difficulty using the proposed
strategy for similar reasons48.
This paper has proposed a strategy for resisting a perceptual debunking argument
in the metaphysics of material objects, and we have just seen how the moral realist
can make use of an analogous strategy to deflect the threat posed by the
evolutionary debunking arguments. All of this suggests a more general upshot about
when a causal explanation of one’s beliefs does and does not give one a defeater for
those beliefs.
48 Thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful discussion here.
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Suppose you believe that p. And suppose you realize that your belief that p is
fully causally explained by some facts, the qs. Then you have a defeater for your
belief that p only if you do not also believe in the obtaining of some metaphysical
law according to which either p is identical with at least one of the qs, or p is
reduced to at least one of the qs, or p is fully grounded in at least one of the qs. If
you have one or more of those additional beliefs, then you gain no defeater.
The upshot is that the debunker has two options. She can either be content with
debunking only the beliefs of those who do not accept that the relevant laws of
metaphysics obtain, or she can widen her target audience and shoulder a much
bigger burden of proof. If the debunker plans to widen her audience, she must also
be ready to debunk beliefs about what is identical with what, what is reduced to
what, and what grounds what.
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